disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

Volume 23 *Mapping* Article 4

4-25-2014

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/disclosure.23.04

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> The true is thus the bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not drunken; and because each, as soon as it detaches itself, dissolves immediately—the whirl is just as much transparent and simple repose.
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> —G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*

> Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
>
> —Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*

In this paper, I explore the opportunities opened by the Internet for a new public sphere and a leveling of political and economic power. I draw from G. W. F. Hegel, early Karl Marx, the Frankfurt School and postmodernism in assessing a contemporary stage of capitalism in which both work and leisure are unhinged from the physical sites of office, factory, mall, household. In turn, I address alienation in the Internet age, a fast or laptop capitalism in which the device is the means of production, and I evaluate Jacques Derrida's claim, transformed into the metaphor of the map, that there is nothing outside the text.

The Internet and Alienation

One could read social media, indeed the Internet as a whole, as one giant exercise in self-mapping, which I contend, is really self-announcement. Alone together,[1] we announce ourselves using electronic means. We also map others. Tweeting immediately comes to mind, but so do Facebook and blogging generally. Perhaps this was inevitable. The cost of self-publication is low: a computer or phone, plus connectivity. Texting is another important means of self-announcement. The average 18-24 year old sends fully 109 text messages a day, and we elders are not far behind.

Even to go this far implies condemnation and the myth of a golden age, before electronic self-announcement. Life is always better and worse before

technological changes. William Ogburn identified cultural lag as catching up with the implications of technologies—the automobile, airplane, assault rifles, now the Internet.[2] In my writing on capitalism and time, I argue for a utopian imaginary that I term the "slowmodern," blending premodern and modern, at once slowing things down and accepting their acceleration. I have written about how we should postpone the postmodern because, in Jürgen Habermas' terms, we haven't yet completed the project of modernity, beginning with the Enlightenment. That is a standard Frankfurt School trope. I rename the postmodern the slowmodern.[3] "Slow" and local are good, as Carlo Petrini,[4] founder of the slow-food movement, and Alice Waters,[5] founder of the Berkeley restaurant Chez Panisse, demonstrate. However, I argue not for turning back the clock to the premodern, but for integrating it in a conception of modernity that includes both slow and fast, local and global.

So, the need to self-map responds to alienation, but it may also create new alienation. That is my topic here. The Internet may involve one in a microphysics of power that enmeshes one further in the "grid" even as the grid—capitalist alienation—is causing one to resort to Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram in order to make connections. The new alienation that self-mapping creates involves the inevitable disappointment of not receiving what Hegel in *Phenomenology of Mind* called "recognition."[6] At stake here are selves and maps, and the ways in which we locate ourselves on other people's maps using electronic means. *The Internet and cell phones make possible a mapping of the self, who writes, photos, and videos her way toward Hegel's recognition.* The problem is that it rarely works, for reasons I explore below.

Substitute in the word "Internet" for the phrase "the true," in the famous excerpt from Hegel that opens this paper. The Internet, after this substitution, is dizzying, even as it responds to a real need to make oneself present. Read this paper as an effort to determine whether Hegel would have approved of Facebook as a means of recognition. When Marx, in his opening phrase, says that "all that is solid melts into air," he is talking about a modernity in which people lose moorings in village, ritual, habit.[7] Set adrift in London, his Dickensian characters, such as the Cratchit family in "Christmas Carol," face "everlasting uncertainty and agitation," at least until Scrooge awakens a changed man. Marx does not settle for recognition but rather for revolution, the distance between him and Hegel.

Early Marx transposes Hegel's discussion of the master-slave dialectic into the materialist framework of class struggle. Early Marx, of his graduate-school days, essayed famous manuscripts on capitalist alienation and its socialist transcendence. The later Marx, of *Capital*, focused on the nuts and bolts of economic theory. Hegel, a German idealist philosopher, helps Marx understand that oppressed people have secret power and potential because, in Hegel's terms,

they can deny the master "recognition." The youthful Marx read Hegel for insights, but put him to critical and political use. Marx wants more than recognition for the working class. He wants capital and control. Yet, at the same time, his analysis of alienation in everyday life owes much to Hegel, who first raised the question of alienation. They differ in that Hegel felt that alienation could be resolved through consciousness, whereas Marx believed that alienation could only be resolved through political and economic practice. Whereas Hegel wrote that all labor involves irremediable self-alienation, "loss of the object," Marx saw a difference between self-externalization in nature through work and capitalist alienation. Indeed, Marx felt that self-externalization could unify work and play, "praxis," and involve no dehumanizing loss of the object *if* work was organized along non-capitalist lines.

Hegel opened up the discussion of alienation, which might be framed not as loss of the object but as loss of self and loss of community, exactly the topics of Marx's early manuscripts of 1843-1844.[8] Marx might well have seen Facebook as an effort to ameliorate alienation by forging electronic community and even cyberdemocracy. Yet there may be a fundamental difference between connection and community, just as there is a fundamental difference between externalization and alienation, which tracks the debate between Hegel and Marx. When one says that Hegel was an idealist and Marx a materialist, one means that Marx felt that liberation could not occur only in one's mind but must be exhibited in one's everyday relationships, such as work, and, as feminists and critical food and body theorists later added, family, food, exercise, and sexuality.

Alienation is loss of community, as early Marx recognized. Hegel thought that all public activity involves a certain self-alienation. The empirical question before us is whether electronically-mediated self-announcement, as I am calling it, can redeem the loss of community and reverse alienation as weak ties become strong ties. Hegel suggests, and Marx agrees, that people need to be recognized, and that what the powerless can deny the powerful is recognition, such as downed pilots during the Vietnam War refusing to tell their Hanoi Hilton captors nothing more than name, rank, and serial number.

Marx argued that people would be recognized, and their alienation redeemed, in the self-managed, post-capitalist workplace. One problem with this is that, today, many people do not spend time in a traditional workplace but "office" anytime, anywhere. Their cells and laptops are their means of production. As well, we are far from a leveling of workplace power and control, as the post-Fordist work organization is, in effect, just as bureaucratic as Max Weber's idealized bureaucracy, with power flowing from the top down. This is tested in a study of the corporate culture of the seemingly post-bureaucratic, ground-up culture of the Amazon.com corporation.[9]

I begin with Hegel and early Marx because they set the stage for a discussion of the Internet. At issue is whether digitality sets us free or further entraps us in a grid of domination. A tentative answer is both—evoking the meaning of the dialectic. Hegel and Marx agreed that the dialectic is a process existing in the world whereby phenomena—social facts, as Émile Durkheim termed them—are both what they are, in their mere appearances, and what they might yet become. A dialectical thinker might view an ice cube as frozen water, which could thaw and, in thawing, becomes something different both from ice and from the initially unfrozen water. The thawed ice cube is perhaps less water than the original water because of evaporation. Hegel provides Marx with a conception of the dialectic as thesis, negation, synthesis—a dynamic process captured in the German word *Aufhebung*.

Marx transposed the talk of ice cubes into talk about capitalism. He does not argue only for the "negation" of capitalism but for its negation, preservation, and transcendence. In plain terms, he wants to retain its strengths and overcome its weaknesses. Its strength is machine-age productivity, which makes it possible to feed and house the world's billions. It also brings democratic revolutions, such as the French and American. Its weakness is that a market economy tends to impoverish many and reward few—auguring the ratio 1/99, which animated Occupy Wall Street and indeed the whole sixties New Left. Similarly, Marx wants to create a form of utopian modernity, or communism—his word. This utopia would combine democracy, the end of hunger, economic leveling and, most important for early Marx, work that would be non-alienating, almost craft-like. He used the Greek word "praxis" to describe this kind of work.

Laptop Capitalism

I transpose Marx's discussion of alienation and freedom into the era of Internet, laptop, or fast capitalism. The laptop and device are the new factories, and they continue the trends, since WWII, of globalization and of the displacement of manual by mental labor—here, by keyboarding. This erodes the boundary between work/public life and leisure/private life, as even a casual glance around a restaurant, mall, or public event will reveal: People are hunched over their devices doing literary work, from email to Instagram, that straddles the boundary between public and private, work and leisure. Microsoft initiated this new world as people with personal computers learned to work with, and across, multiple open screens, Facebooking and responding to email nearly simultaneously. One cannot infer whether the person is working or playing because they no longer need to don the work uniforms of blue- and white-collar laborers; there is no dress code for officing anytime, anywhere, which is to read clothing as a kind of map in an earlier stage of capitalism. And so I'm interested

in developing, as I began to do in my 1989 *Fast Capitalism*, a Marxist account of the Internet that draws from the Frankfurt School's concept of domination and postmodernism's concept of discourse.

By "domination" the Frankfurt School critical theorists, such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, referred to deepened ideology that surrounds and suffuses us, making it difficult to think the world otherwise. "Ideology" was Marx's nineteenth-century term for systems of false ideas about material reality, such as, famously, religions that promise people happiness in an afterlife. The Frankfurt theorists argue that, after WWII, with the rise of total administration (think of George Orwell) and the culture industries, ideology has been deepened and people don't think in utopian ways. They are "one-dimensional" thinkers, in Marcuse's terms. Postmodernists such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault help us understand these constructs discursively, as, in effect, writing—arguments for one state of affairs over others. By "discourse" they refer to all the ways we signify, and thus make arguments about, the world, including traditional writing and post-textual forms of expression such as film, music, web pages. I blend these German and French themes as I try to read ideologies as literary outcomes that could have been scripted differently. Advertising, for example, is not a natural or value-free discourse that can be evaluated simply in terms of its implied truth claims, such as how a certain automobile spells freedom and fulfillment. It is a political discourse in that it narrows and focuses attention, diverting people from a deeper questioning about consumerism.

This understanding of discourse has implications for academic writing and reading, which are not simply value-free scholarly modes of presentation. Positivism is a writing style pretending that the author does not haunt every sentence and literary gesture. This is not to diminish academic writing but to notice that scholarship is simply one mode of literary work among others that has no monopoly of an epistemological good housekeeping seal of approval. Science is science fiction, where we understand fiction to be the world narrated by a situated subject, an author by another name. Method is the literary means of cleansing science of passion, perspective, politics, but it is itself a literary trope, a way of writing an article or dissertation that I consider de-authorizing. Indeed, pre-publication reviews of this paper argued for a more scholarly presentation, less first-person presence which condemns the writing to an inferior status as a blog. As a non-positivist, I argue for that first-person presence because I believe that the reader deserves to know where the author stands, from where she or he is writing. A public intellectual, as I argued in *Public Sociology,* is she who does not produce secret writing methodologically cleansed of the author.[10] The public intellectual lays bare basic assumptions, writes about important social issues, and

acknowledges that one's data or arguments could be presented differently, inviting readers to compose their own versions.

Of interest here is the role of the Internet in facilitating discursive practices of domination and liberation, including academic writing. It is easy to write off the Internet as a disciplinary grid, combining Amazon shopping with Facebook distraction. I take a somewhat less German and more French position, stressing the Internet's potentials for cyberdemocracy and for a literary empowering as people without literary agents break into print (or pixels). This circumvents elite gatekeeping (agents, publishers, editors) and allows everyone to join the conversation, which raises another question about whether tweeting half-baked opinions is what the Greeks and Frankfurters had in mind when they placed value on a talkative polity of considered public speakers. French theorists might cringe at the denigration of opinions as half-baked, rejecting the Archimedean implication that there is Reason available to theorists who stand above the fray. I am composing a book entitled *Age of Opinion* in which I consider message boards and Twitter as a new public sphere in which knee-jerk reaction replaces considered thought and evidence-based argument.

Jürgen Habermas, a second-generation Frankfurt theorist, captures utopia in his image of the ideal speech situation, in which people speak freely about issues of the day, toward Rousseau's goal of consensus. This was an animating construct for the white and black New Lefts (SDS and SNCC) during the sixties, as activists would conduct long meetings in order to ensure ground-up, grassroots agreement about their political program. In the SDS's 1962 manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, Tom Hayden termed this "participatory democracy," differentiating the American New Left from the top-down old left modeled on Lenin's notion of a vanguard party of Bolshevik intellectuals and tacticians.[11]

We may infer that work is alienating for most people because, from within the working day, they "resist" capitalist command and control by using the Internet for private reasons. Their work is not praxis, self-creating activity, and they use the Internet as a means of escape and also to remedy their deficit of social ties. It is tempting to pose the question of whether a Facebook friend counts as a "real" friend. But young people, who grew up with the Internet, move facilely between online and offline relationships, even as they send 109 texts a day and spend most of their time glued to their phones, which they use to self-map.

And so my issue is whether one can achieve recognition, in Hegel's sense, or disalienation in Marx's sense, using these technologies of self-mapping. Certainly, one can use the Internet to start and further social movements, as the Arab Spring and Occupy demonstrate. But, as I argue in *Texting Toward Utopia*, this seems the most literary of ages as the young pour forth their words, albeit below the adult radar of official writing.[12] Kids text, tweet, and post thousands of words, even as they may be late submitting their Shakespeare papers. I argue that

kids write, as we all do, to leave a trace, to connect, to self-map. They search precisely for recognition, especially where schooling has beaten them pulpless as schools prepare children for a pre-labor force, with homework and other productivist expectations. Kids haunt the night as vampires because they are so alienated during the day. Social media and texting relieve them of their burdens as they hope to be recognized for the fledgling selves they are.

Much as Marx talked about circuits of production in capitalism, one can identify circuits of circulation in the process of self-mapping/self-locating, using the Internet:

- Message sent
- Message received and reciprocated
- Dialogue constrained or extended

Hegel's recognition is found in the second part of this circuit, when the text or posting has been acknowledged. If the second circuit isn't closed, one lacks recognition, which Marx called alienation. Prototypically, a busy interlocutor will respond to someone on her contact list by saying LOL or keying in an emoticon. That's recognition. But, especially among teenagers, there is ample ambiguity about what happens next. Either the circuit is kept open and dialogue is extended, perhaps limitlessly, or else it is shut down, largely by the silence of one of the interlocutors. Either of these outcomes—being ignored after recognition has occurred or having to spend all day monitoring one's device for a dangling conversation that rapidly becomes an albatross—is alienating. Whether it is "more" alienating than being ignored in the first place perhaps depends on whether one has weak or strong ties with one's interlocutor.

Or am I wrong about the first message, which in some respects is the most crucial? One knows that a friend is blue, and needs attention. A lack of reciprocity doesn't necessarily alienate the sender in this circumstance. Similarly, a dialogue dropped could mean that one's interlocutor has suddenly become busy—driving, working, studying, answering the front door or a call on an old-fashioned land line. Uncertainty prevails, which could be an alienation in its own right. There is a certain postmodern experience of sending messages in a bottle out to sea, with little certainty about reciprocity, let alone intimacy and community.

Perhaps, for younger and even older people, the most alienating circumstance is not being ignored but having to do too much reciprocal messaging, which becomes almost work-like. This is especially true for people with large contact lists and a significant number of social-media friends and followers. Perhaps one's contact list is manageable, almost by definition, when it includes only everyday intimates, a kind of electronic village people by family

and close friends. This is *Gemeinschaft*, characteristic of premodern social life, and not the impersonal *Gessellschaft* of organizational association and affiliation.

Compulsive connectivity, a flight from alienation, may produce alienated labor by becoming too burdensome. Everyone knows what it means to have one's e-mail inbox cluttered, and to be "behind" in responding to text messages. One might surmise that self-mapping is not odious only when one inhabits a cyberworld with people who are already intimates. Connection reproduces alienation when everyone is needy and the cost of messaging is so low.

I am interested here in how to read self-mapping, which Hegel and early Marx would have considered an act of self-externalization, projecting oneself outward. In the instantaneity and global reach of the Internet, everyone has a huge canvas. Hegel might have regarded every text act as an alienation, involving loss of the object. Marx might have theorized Internet interactions and self-revelation that avoid alienation by authentically expressing the person and by forging community with like-minded others. It is hard to imagine either guy on Facebook but Marx might have emailed, blogged, and networked in his work organizing the Communist International. Perhaps the Internet would have caused Hegel to think differently about consciousness as he might have linked, as I do here and in all my work, writing and self-consciousness.

A key means of self-mapping is the selfie, a photo taken of oneself. I have described selfies taken by many women as "the male gaze gone viral," which trades on a feminist cultural studies that examines the positioning of women subjects by the men who capture them in the lens. Selfies are interesting because they anticipate their viewing. Self-framing has gendered, generational, and sexual implications. Think of the photos one selects for Internet dating purposes. These map the self, just as one's personal profile maps. It is not enough to suggest that men objectify women. Selfie-taking young women may objectify themselves for men, suggesting that they are agents who could have made different choices.

Alienation causes people to seek solace online. But going online may lead to disappointment because people get ignored, conversations drop, they cannot disconnect, and they drown in pixels. The attempt to leave a trace and find community leads to connection, for which the paradigm is Facebook friendship. Hegel and Marx would have wanted to see the whites of people's eyes, not their avatars and screen names. To be sure, email is efficient and Wikipedia provides bibliographies. Texting is timely. But being online requires privatization, poring over one's phone, tablet, or laptop, creating the postmodern experience of people in public staring down but not across.

Nothing Outside the Map?

Recognition beeps, chimes, vibrates. It is—in a sense—real. But postmodern recognition rests on disembodiment, which cannot be made good by the two-dimensional Internet dating photo or even by Skype or YouTube, which rest on attributed embodiment: "That looks like you in the video, but I cannot be sure." The map is itself merely a construction, an approximation. People map differently, with some maps containing distances between towns' outskirts or city halls. Using a GPS or MapQuest while driving quickly reveals the undecidability of mapping, as one could have taken different routes to the same endpoint or some maps have not kept up with the pace of road renovation.

A map is a text in this sense. Tweeting self-maps, enabling the follower to locate the tweeting self in time and perhaps place, but offering only a slender slice of a map to the whole self. This is perhaps true of all autobiographical texts but especially true where self-mapping occurs using only a few words. The briefer the map, the more recognition it commands, including the ironic Facebook action of "liking," which fails to explain the reasons for liking but merely tallies their frequency. I am fairly certain that Facebook liking wouldn't have met Hegel's standard for recognition or Marx's criterion of disalienated labor.

Maps are busy and time-consuming texts, as social-media users and texters can attest. A student kept texting me about her thesis, while I was driving, and I asked her, by text, to call me. She did, but she apologized for the intrusion, capturing a profound generational rift. Try calling the younger people on one's contact list and keep track of the number of people who answer. The aversion to spontaneous, uncharted interaction—also a text—is chronic and reproduces itself as "everyone" texts, or, in the cartographic metaphor, maps.

I am not falling back on an essentialist or positivist view of the real self, who can somehow be approximated by an Ur-map that freezes social nature perfectly. Leo Tolstoy, at great length, was still writing fiction, mapping, as it were. Marx's first volume of *Capital* still needed three additional volumes to be complete. We cannot improve the rate or quality of Hegelian recognition by redesigning Facebook or tweets to deploy additional characters. The text is still always already fiction. But self-mapping rests on the premise that one can narrate the self, which, judging by the busyness of social media and text messaging, is always a process of deferring. Derrida would get that recognition, resting on a self-mapping text, cannot assume a stable and truth-telling narrator somehow outside of context, outside of the language games of the moment, or language, or culture, or generation.

That understanding of the prison of language is basic for Friedrich Nietzsche, which underwrites much of critical theory and postmodernism. Nietzsche, the first critic of the Enlightenment and its faith in science, rejected

positivist knowledge gained by standing outside the world and simply reflecting it. There is no outside, no standing apart. There is nothing beyond the map, except driving (or running) through the state of Nebraska. Even then, one cannot be sure when one is leaving Nebraska and entering Iowa. One has to place faith in the roadside signage bidding one goodbye and welcome. We recently drove from Texas to New Mexico, heading for Santa Fe, and as we crossed over we expected the time to change from Central to Mountain. Of course, we checked our phones! One of us had a phone that changed immediately, while the others took a mile or more. Time maps, and phones map, and the welcome to New Mexico sign maps. We could only be certain that we were driving on I-40 and heading toward our destination, having driven this route before.

We can call for better maps, including maps of the self, as if we can ever capture the world in the text. Derrida reminds us that there is nothing outside of textuality, which his detractors read as proof that he was an idealist. But he is merely saying that everything is map, replica, which, in a sense, authors as well as represents. One does not just post photos on an Internet dating site but creates one's whole profile, including interests, occupation, basic values. Representation argues, for one state of affairs or another. Date me, marry me, our maps overlap. I use Internet dating as an example because everyone spins age, weight, income, openness to experience.

If maps are texts, self-mapping involves telling our own stories and then going public with them, using the Internet and texting. My Derridean point is that the maps/stories do not simply reflect the person but create her as we exercise the power of the pixel. As well, we are created by other people's maps of us: She's slutty, he's on drugs. In California, recent legislation permits kids to remove previous Facebook posts that cast them in a bad light, acknowledging that social media usage involves self-assemblage. A young woman told me that she didn't want to be photographed at her bridal shower with a drink in her hand; she drank, but took small sips and then put down the drink. She realized that her photos could go viral. A research question for these times is whether viral presence earns healthy recognition in Hegel's sense and thus leads to positive self-esteem and, if retweeted, connection and community.

In mapping ourselves using the Internet, texts, photos and videos, we create identities designed to earn recognition and perhaps even love. We do this because we lack community and intimacy. And we are too busy to go to bars and pick up dates. Alienation begets self-mapping, but self-mapping may be alienating in its own right, for reasons I have discussed: being ignored or being overwhelmed with the obligation to respond. And our social-media "friends" do not always, or even often, become face-to-face friends, although I have learned from my children and students that we elder often draw too impermeable a boundary between offline and online relationships. My kids have intimate friends,

who are also "friends" and contacts, blending strong and weak ties in the complex assemblage of the electronic grids of relationships.

In other work, I have called for "e-sociologies" that map mapping—texting, tweeting, twerking. Sociology builds on Urban Dictionary with street and screen understandings of what is really going on, doing phenomenological sociology in the natural attitude or what John O'Neill called "wild sociology."[13] This is not to collapse completely the Husserlian distinction between the natural and theoretical attitudes—life as it is lived and reflected life—but to insert contemporary sociology in the folkways and mores of generations who live their lives online and on the screen. Whatever we may think of the thesis of postmodernity, our fast capitalism today is framed by the Internet and devices in ways that challenge the traditional private/public boundary as well as any consideration of identity.

I am suggesting that a wild sociology recognizes identity as a narrative accomplishment that could be linked to a map. This joins phenomenology and Foucault where Foucault considered everyday grids of power that exert a disciplining effect. How else to understand e-mail, texting, and tweeting? Facebook commands attention even as we try to look away, perhaps yearning for a pre-postmodern moment when work was work and private life private. So-called Internet addiction is a compulsive yearning for recognition, opening the circuit of message and response that, for many younger people, defines interaction today. We elders are not immune, especially if we need to communicate with younger natives in the wilderness. Hence, we need a wild e-sociology that addresses self-mapping as a legitimate issue.

Karen Horney, in her *Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, identifies three kinds of neurosis: clingy/needy, chilly and self-isolating, and the will to power over others.[14] Sometimes, these overlap. Hegel's recognition, like Maslow's need for love and belonging, is non-neurotic, balancing reciprocal recognition with individuation.[15] One notices that a great deal of self-mapping seems to be clingy and needy, with people seeking to close the circuit of recognition electronically, but that, almost by definition, they can never get enough recognition from others who have their own neuroses and thus neglect them. "Ignoring," in response to electronic interventions from Facebook friend requests to cell phone calls, is built into voluminous electronic interaction both because the recipient has his or her own neuroses and thus is not positioned to offer recognition and because everyone is clingy/needy and thus there is communicative overload, from which any rational person would shrink. One hypothesizes that the needy neurotic is likely to overshare.[16]

As I compose this essay, I am performing a self-experiment. I am limiting the number of text messages that I send to my circle of intimates. I am trying to determine whether I am an "initiator" or a "receiver." To initiate does not

necessarily mean, in Horney's terms, that one is neurotic. One may simply need a modicum of Maslow's love and belonging. After all, my contacts are intimates, people I see regularly as I negotiate the thin boundary between online and offline interaction. So far, the experiment supports my hunch that I am an initiator. I am also curious about whether the texts I receive are aimless or aim-intended, whether, in other words, my contacts "want" anything from me, other than recognition. I have kids who always need money and graduate students who need advice. Recently, my wife needed powdered sugar and she texted me. I was driving and she didn't get an immediate response, and so she texted again: "Confirm." She texts instrumentally, being in her 50s and non-clingy. I tried Facebook and tired of it almost immediately, especially of its banality and narcissism. Twitter was an even shorter-lived experiment, although I "followed" a famous tennis player whose tweets were mildly revealing as to his workout regimen. I have since sampled other professional tennis players' tweets, and they are, for the most part, quickly wrought and exhibitionist, as are the tweets of other athletes. Most tennis pros did not attend college and they use social media in order to enhance their "brand," garnering heftier endorsement contracts from racket and clothing manufacturers. The goal here is not recognition but marketing, which, in a sense, depends on recognition, such as number of followers or friends.

Recognition is commodified by Internet advertisers and businesses, who keep track of hits, visits, and likes. Internet advertising and thus corporate value are valorized (valued) by way of such recognition. This is not what Hegel had in mind as he concerned himself with becoming fully human. Internet cookies merely extend the logic of capital online as we evolve from Fordism to post-Fordism. Recognition, which Hegel meant to be interpersonal, becomes a synonym for visibility, which is readily tracked by search engines such as Google. Academia has its own flawed version of recognition in scholarly citation indexes and impact assessments. The problem with the social-science citation index is that it ignores "visibility" in books, but narrows knowledge to certain mainstream journals. Hence, recognition becomes synonymous with reputation, which is also accessed by Googled visibility on the Internet.

We all know of stories where online interaction led to offline relationships, even to enduring intimacy such as marriage. Internet dating promises precisely that. But most of the self-mapping occurring electronically does not culminate in offline friendship, let alone real intimacy and community building, but remains pixelated. We could read Facebook and texting as pastimes, leisure activities, which punctuate the boring working or studying day. Early Marx appropriated Hegel's notion of recognition in order to start a revolution as he pivoted on Hegel's master-slave dialectic in order to portray and foment class struggle—the working class moving from being a class in itself to a class for itself, a collectivist anticipation of Jean-Paul Sartre's writings on agency and

identity in *Being and Nothingness*,[17] which he rendered more materialist in his later *Critique of Dialectical Reason*,[18] which could reasonably be read as a version of this paper before the Internet.

But perhaps Hegel and Marx anticipated the Internet, or, better, the globalized instantaneity of fast capitalism, where Hegel characterizes experience as a "Bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not drunken"[19] and Marx predicts that "all that is solid [will melt] into air."[20] They understood that modernity was rearranging experience and knowledge in ways that anticipated a post-Newtonian, postmodern world, even if we are really in a late stage of modernity (per the Frankfurt School) and not beyond it. The Internet melts solidity and breeds Bacchanalian inebriation precisely in order to sell commodities, including cultural ones, and divert people from their own suffering. Internet compulsion is self-alienation, even as people use the Internet to map their way into relationships, friendships, connections. In Internet capitalism, the laptop is the means of production, as well as a mode of escape. Now, discipline is anytime/anywhere, and no one is really off the grid, confirming Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, and Michel Foucault's predictions of a brave new world.

Seeking interaction via the Internet and phones responds to the problem of alienation, but redoubles it as people almost inevitably ended up dissatisfied. Hegel's immersion in the Bacchanalian whirl of pixilated postmodernity is medicalized as addiction—to one's device. The melting of solidity into air suggests Dali but could also describe Internet dating, as people spin themselves into weird transmutations of who they really are. Perhaps there is no "really" anymore, as identity has lost any mooring in a stable self.

Where maps used to rest on the premise of a to-be-mapped signified—the best route from Topeka to Tuscaloosa—postmodern mapping loses any reference to the signified, to the world. Mapping is always already self-mapping as the self oozes into the world, just as I described texts doing in my *Fast Capitalism*, composed at the dawning of the Internet era.[21] I could not have anticipated social media, tweeting, texting as modes of being, not just of writing. A "mode of being" can be gauged both extensively, by the analysis of time use, and intensively, by the extent to which an activity, such as checking one's device, invades and constitutes identity. Work used to be a mode of being, outside of which lay leisure. Now, self-mapping is both extensive and intensive; there is little privacy or downtime. And the map has lost its predicate, the signified world. It is, instead, a map of the self that fails to achieve what Sigmund Freud called individuation—separation from the world. That is precisely Hegel's drunken Bacchanalian nightmare.

From Map to Manifesto

But the nightmare ends when one awakens. This is the promise of early Marx and the New Left as they build a new society from the ground up and the inside out. The Internet can either reinforce domination or spark resistance that leads to utopia. One hopes that all is not map and that utopia lies outside its boundaries.

Map suggests replica—of Parisian neighborhoods or the route to buried treasure. I have established that map, like all figures, is text in a post-textual moment. Discourse has expanded to include all self-expression, as noted earlier. But utopia lies beyond the map as replica, that which cannot be merely reflected or represented unless we decide that the present is a plenitude of being. If problems such as domination remain, we need a map transcending, or leading beyond, maps, a meta-map, perhaps, that leads to a new history. This writing is the manifesto, a political call to arms based on a cogent analysis of what is wrong. The *Communist Manifesto* and the Port Huron Statement, separated by 114 years, are famous examples.

These two manifestos were printed on paper, the first bound as a book and the second mimeographed, sold for a quarter and passed around as the 1960s unfolded. They left their mark on readers who joined social movements at their behest. One wonders whether either manifesto would have mattered, or perhaps mattered more, if posted on the Internet. On the one hand, every web page risks sinking into the murky Sargasso Sea of the Internet, unnoticed. On the other, it is difficult to stay invisible on the Internet, especially with hyperlinks that coax readers to venture further. I have written of the post-baby-boom pulpless generations for which connection means Internet access, if not town-hall meetings.

Dissertations and monographs are being prepared on digital literacy, cultural/media studies, and political activism. The question of the relationship between new digital literacies and political organizing is central today, especially as "Internet presence" is widely recognized as indispensable for fund raising and networking. If our media culture[22] was born the day of JFK's 1963 assassination and the ensuing weekend, when we all watched Dallas in real time, the decline of newspapers and television news can be traced to the Internet and craigslist. Similarly, the crisis of publishing and shrinking library budgets are Internet-era phenomena, again begging a host of research questions about digital literacy.

Adorno, in his Nietzschean pessimism, would have emphasized the coopting, conformist tendencies of the blogosphere, even as his aphorisms in *Minima Moralia* could be read as blog-like.[23] Derrida, although Nietzschean in his own way, might have welcomed the broadening of literacy and the public sphere, as he intimated in his late work, *Specters of Marx*.[24] Can manifestos

matter when posted online, or is the Internet merely a personal canvas on which Pinterest displaces polemic and program? It is perhaps too early to tell.

Notes

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13. John O'Neill, *Making Sense Together: An Introduction to Wild Sociology (*New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
14. Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1937).
15. Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton, NJ: D Van Nostrand, 1962).
16. See Emily Gould *And the Heart Says Whatever* (New York: Free Press, 2010); Emily Gould, "Exposed," *New York Times Magazine* (May 25, 2008); Ben Agger, *Oversharing: Presentations of Self in the Internet Age* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
17. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
18. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (London: NLB, 1976).
19. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind.*
20. Marx, *The Communist Manifesto.*
21. Agger, *Fast Capitalism.*
22. Douglas Kellner, *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern* (London: Routledge, 1995).
23. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (London: Verso, 2006).

24. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

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